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 8  Concepts of Gender Difference in Genetics 
 Helga  Satzinger 
 Genetics is a quantitative subject. It deals with ratios, with measurements, and with the geometri-
cal relationships of chromosomes. 
 —Alfred Sturtevant and George Beadle (1939) 1 
 Alfred Sturtevant (1891–1970) and George Beadle (1903–1989), two prominent repre-
sentatives of Thomas Hunt Morgan’s school of  Drosophila  genetics, started their 
textbook,  An Introduction to Genetics (1939), with the claim that genetics was “a math-
ematically formulated subject that is logically complete and self-contained.” 2 The first 
chapter is entitled “Sex Chromosomes.” It begins with the observation that “[t]he exis-
tence of diversity among organisms is one of the most familiar of natural phenomena. 
Every child recognizes not only the differences between dogs, cats, and men, but also 
those between different individuals of each of these species.” Sturtevant and Beadle 
presented genetics as “the science that deals with the underlying causes of these resem-
blances and differences.” Focusing on “the cases of discontinuous variation [which] are 
most easily dealt with,” they went right to the heart of the matter and declared: “[t]he 
most widespread and generally recognized discontinuous character is that of sex.” 3 In 
their view “sex differences” provided the paradigm for Mendelian genetics in 1939. 
Consequently, a founding couple in genetics is depicted on the frontispiece of Sturte-
vant and Beadle’s introduction. A very detailed drawing by Edith Wallace, personal 
assistant of Thomas Hunt Morgan (1866–1945), shows two fruit flies followed by the 
caption “Wild-type Drosophila melanogaster. Male at left, female at right.” 4 
 “We have attempted to treat the subject […] as a logical development in which each 
step depends on the preceding ones,” claimed Sturtevant and Beadle. 5 One might 
argue, however, that the creation of an origin narrative, commencing with Adam and 
Eve, is not necessarily a logical procedure. In times of evolutionary thought, a different 
origin could have been seen as more “logical.” The primary case for inheritance could 
have been seen in the invention of cell division in the primordial cell, and following 
that, the spontaneous creation of differences in the offspring. According to this “logic,” 
processes of cell fusion producing a new generation of organisms would be a later 
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innovation in evolution. Starting the science of genetics with a binary, discontinuous 
sex difference is not a logical step; it rather prioritizes, whether deliberately or not, a 
distinction derived from the social conventions of a society which conceptualizes its 
own origin from the normative difference between man and woman as a binary, dis-
continuous one. What is new about modern genetics, compared to classic and other 
natural philosophical theories on procreation, is the attempt to answer this question: 
what are the maternal and especially the paternal material contributions to the off-
spring? 6 Does genetics finally provide a new approach to the old Roman and purely 
social definition of paternity—“The status as husband makes the father” ( pater est quem 
nuptiae demonstrant )—by introducing a material proof? 7 
 Without referring to the nebulous realm of paternity, but staying strictly within the 
historiographical framework of scientific practice, Sturtevant and Beadle’s logic simply 
derives from that of their experiments with  Drosophila melanogaster in the second 
decade of the twentieth century. The resulting genes, localized as discrete units on 
chromosomes, were made by mating. 8 The experiments were designed to trace the 
transmission of binary and discontinuous differences of members of one species, or its 
laboratory-bred strains, to the next generation. For this purpose male and female speci-
mens had to copulate and procreate. Consequently, these experiments reduced the 
meaning of inheritance and excluded from its gaze the transmission of other character-
istic, but nevertheless inheritable, morphological features of these organisms, which 
defined their taxonomical status. Sturtevant and Beadle’s type of genetic investigation 
did not deal with all inheritable features. In the words of the geneticist Edwin G. Conk-
lin (1863–1952) in 1915, the scope of Mendelian genetics was rather narrow as it 
excluded the role of the cytoplasm in the transmission of bodily features: “We are 
vertebrates because our mothers were vertebrates and produced eggs of the vertebrate 
pattern; but the colour of our skin and hair and eyes, our sex, stature and mental pecu-
liarities were determined by [Mendelian factors in the chromosomes of; H. S.] the 
sperm as well as by the egg from which we came.” 9 In addition, Mendelian genetics 
could not investigate the transmission of hereditary traits from one cell to another 
during ontogenesis. 10 
 The reasons for, and consequences of, Sturtevant and Beadle’s choice of sex differ-
ence as the paradigm of genetics were hidden behind the claim of providing a purely 
mathematical approach. Their case is just one example of the centrality, but invisibility, 
of gendered concepts in the history of genetics. 11 Several gender concepts were preva-
lent at different times; they differed considerably and were sometimes articulated, 
sometimes not. They all played their part in contemporary debates on the social gender 
order; in the 1920s and 1930s these debates were also, at least in Germany, part of the 
anti-Semitic debate on racial purity and superiority. 12 
 Despite the centrality of gender concepts for genetics, they are generally not 
considered relevant to configurations of biological thought, neither by the scientists 
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themselves, nor by a considerable number of historians. Outlined below are some 
examples of the variety of gendered concepts present in genetics in the early twentieth 
century. These can be seen in the research into fertilization processes and sex difference 
in Germany before 1933, in the establishment of the chromosomal theory of heredity 
and chromosomal sex difference in the first decade of the twentieth century, in the 
genetics of sex difference in the 1920s, and finally in the problem of sex difference in 
molecular genetics in the 1950s and 1960s. The scientists dealing with these issues to 
be discussed here were Theodor (1862–1915) and Marcella Boveri (1863–1950), Nettie 
M. Stevens (1861–1912), Richard Goldschmidt (1878–1958), Felix Mainx (1900–1983), 
and François Jacob (1920–2013). 
 8.1  De-gendering Sexuality—Sex without Differences 
 In the early 1930s, and in a way that still seems astonishing, apparently clear assump-
tions about sex differences were questioned by scientists themselves. This develop-
ment, had it happened today, would be seen as an effect of postmodern feminist or 
even queer scholarship: biologists questioned the binary sex difference exactly at the 
main site of its usual incarnation within the paradigm of cell theory: the female egg 
and the male sperm. 13 
 In the German-speaking scientific community of the early decades of the twentieth 
century, “sexuality” was seen as “a problem of genetics.” 14 Sexuality meant all the pro-
cesses involved in the development and fusion of different germ cells to generate a new 
organism. Shortly before Sturtevant and Beadle started their “introduction to genetics” 
with the unquestioned assumption of a binary, discontinuous sex difference, a c. 
90-page monograph by the Prague botanist Felix Mainx entitled “Sexuality as a Prob-
lem of Genetics” gave a very different picture. 15 The booklet was published by the 
respected Gustav Fischer Verlag in Jena. Mainx based his considerations on at least two 
decades of research of zoologists, botanists, and specialists on unicellular organisms 
called “protists.” These scientists had combined the search for the mechanisms of 
inheritance at the level of genes, chromosomes, and cytoplasm with the investigation 
of various fertilization processes. They sought to elucidate the question of how sex dif-
ferences were transmitted from one generation to the next and how they unfolded 
during ontogenesis. A prominent center for this research was the Kaiser Wilhelm Insti-
tute for Biology in Berlin-Dahlem from its inauguration in 1914. Here Carl Correns 
(1864–1933) studied sex determination in plants, Richard Goldschmidt (1878–1958) 
explored the question for animals (insects and vertebrae), and Max Hartmann (1876–
1962) investigated processes in unicellular eukaryotes, which he identified as mating. 
Based on this work he provided a general theory of “sexuality.” 16 
 In 1933 Mainx discussed the main current theories of the inheritance and determi-
nation of sex difference and came to a surprising conclusion. Even today the process of 
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fertilization, understood as the fusion of two germ cells after meiosis, is usually concep-
tualized in the framework of a veritable classic romance between female egg cell and 
male spermatozoon by evoking the full repertoire of a gender order invented in 
nineteenth-century European bourgeois society. 17 Furthermore, the mere name “egg” 
for the “female” procreative cell identifies the female as the caring, nourishing ele-
ment, which does not have the same procreative potency as the sperm. 18 Minority 
voices today go beyond the egg–sperm romance and claim that the egg also is active 
and energetic, thereby adjusting the model to late-twentieth-century feminist agen-
das. 19 In a comparably more dramatic move, Felix Mainx in 1933 proposed abandoning 
all notions of femininity and masculinity in the conceptualization of germ cells and 
fertilization. “Sexuality,” understood as processes of fertilization, should be defined 
only by the fusion of two cell nuclei resulting in a nucleus with a double set of chromo-
somes, followed by reduction and division during the production of germ cells to cre-
ate the procreative cells with one set of chromosomes each. These cells had to fuse to 
create the next generation. 20 Sex difference was not necessary for processes involving 
sexuality. According to Mainx, sex difference did not come first: 
 The bipolar differentiations of gametes, […], genitals, and “individuals characterized by a particu-
lar sex” [ “Geschlechtsindividuen” ], which are generally connected with the process of copulation, 
should be regarded as secondary. They have to be seen as adaptations to the function of sexual 
procreation [ geschlechtliche Fortpflanzung ]. The increase in the copulation probability and the need 
to supply the zygote with metabolic resources [ Reservestoffversorgung ] are most likely the promi-
nent elements of an advantage in the selection process during the phylogenetic evolution of these 
differentiations. 21 
 In short, Mainx concluded that there was no universal bipolar sex difference to start 
evolution with, let alone genetics. Thus, the prevalent “comprehensive style” 22 in Ger-
man biology, with its characteristic inclusion of the problems of evolution, develop-
ment, and sex difference into genetics, had led to a more complex picture than the one 
the Morgan school could provide. 
 One reviewer of Mainx’s publication was very outspoken in this respect. The bota-
nist E. G. Pringsheim commented, 
 [s]ince we discovered the processes of fertilization in algae and unraveled the very complicated 
situation in most of the fungi, our knowledge of sexuality in organisms of the lower taxa has 
increased considerably. A variety of phenomena could be shown which dramatically exceeds 
everything we might imagine. 23 
 Pringsheim conceded that the assumption of a binary difference between man and 
woman as the model for all sexual difference used to be the unquestioned basis of all 
considerations. The new scientific results showed, however, that the generalization of 
this sex difference was inadequate. According to Pringsheim, even Max Hartmann’s 
notion of “relative sexuality” was inappropriate. Using the processes of conjugation of 
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unicellular organisms, Hartmann had developed the concept of a scale between male 
and female, along which individual cells could be situated. On this scale, the behavior 
of one and the same cell could be described as “female” if a more “male” cell was 
around, and “male,” if a more “female” cell showed up. According to Pringsheim and 
Mainx, sexuality—the various processes of cell fusion to start a new organism—could 
not be ordered in a bipolar mode, as was shown very strikingly by the “multipolar sexu-
ality” of fungi. 24 There was either a variety of differences or no “sex difference” at all in 
the fusing cells. Procreation was not bound to the existence of a binary, discontinuous 
sex difference. 
 Further evidence of the evolution of a multiplicity of “sexualities,” was provided by 
the seemingly innocent strawberry plant ( Fragaria ). This plant could display the most 
diverse types of sexual identity. In 1931 the Berlin geneticist Elisabeth Schiemann 
(1881–1972) had shown that the plant could be hermaphroditic; it could be male or 
female, and there were cases where a genotypic sex change took place in the flowers of 
one and the same plant. 25 The plant, during its lifetime, could change its chromosomal 
constitution, generating at a particular point in time either “male” or “female” organs, 
and sometime later the opposite. 
 Using “male” or “female” to characterize organisms and their behavior in procre-
ation and inheritance obviously led to a rather inconsistent and confusing picture. 
Mainx and others tried to get rid of these categories for the sake of clarity and openness 
in their biological observations. In a way, they tried to “undo gender” in exactly the 
area usually seen as the unassailable refuge of “natural” masculinity and femininity: 
sex difference in the realm of procreation. 26 But there was a catch: with the identifica-
tion of chromosomes as the decisive components in inheritance, a new gendering 
within cells and their elements took place. This happened simultaneously with the 
development in which the gendering of full germ cells was fundamentally questioned. 
This parallel development will be revisited later in this chapter. 
 8.2  Gendering Cell Components and Inheritance 
 As Pringsheim pointed out in 1933, the categories “male” and “female” had been con-
venient at the beginning of cell-based investigation of inheritance in late nineteenth 
century. They were uncontested when in 1903 Theodor Boveri, in cooperation with his 
wife Marcella, identified chromosomes in the cell nuclei as the crucial physical struc-
tures harboring the Mendelian “Anlagen” or “Erbfaktoren.” 27 These chromosomes and 
their transmission through germ cells and the germ line behaved the same way the 
Mendelian “Anlagen” (later called “genes”) were supposed to do, according to the 
newly rediscovered Mendelian laws. 28 The correlation between chromosomes and 
Mendelian “genes” was established around 1903 and was only later, and with some 
changes, referred to as the chromosomal theory of heredity. 29 It was based on a 
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considerable amount of experimental and observational work on the processes of cell 
division, germ cell maturation, fertilization, and ontogenetic development. From the 
late 1880s, and after 1897 in cooperation with his wife Marcella, Theodor Boveri had 
used sea urchins and the parasitic worm  Ascaris megalocephala to investigate the inter-
play between cell plasma and chromosomes in cell fusion during fertilization, and in 
cell division and differentiation during embryonic development, in an effort to under-
stand what they called “Vererbung” (inheritance or heredity). 
 Starting points in the work of the Boveris were provided by the assumptions of 
August Weismann (1834–1914) and Carl Nägeli (1817–1891). Weismann had postu-
lated a division between a germ line and the line of somatic cells, which allowed for a 
transmission of inheritable material from one generation to the next via the germ cells, 
and an unequal distribution of the inheritable material during the development of dif-
ferentiated, somatic, cells of an organism. Nägeli had postulated a minute substance 
within the cells, which originated in equal quantity from the paternal and maternal 
organisms. The axiomatic setting of a paternal and maternal equality in the contribu-
tion to the offspring guided the search for the responsible substance of inheritance. 30 
 Theodor Boveri began in the 1880s with fertilization experiments using sea urchins. 
He manipulated the larger, cytoplasm-containing “female” cells so that their chromo-
somes were no longer visible and could be regarded as being lost. 31 Fertilization of these 
cells with sperm of different sea urchin species in his view resulted in sea urchin larvae 
showing paternal features only—thus indicating the central role of the chromosomes 
as the transmitters of the hereditary “Anlagen.” Further work elaborated on the mecha-
nisms of cell division and identified the centrosomes and spindle apparatus as cellular 
“organs” which provided—normally—an exact distribution of chromosomes into the 
“daughter” cells. 32 
 Based on the conviction that a precise mechanism was at work, the analysis of 
abnormal distributions of chromosomes during embryonic development became pos-
sible. This resulted in the conclusion that each chromosome had a specific importance 
for the organism, equal to the Mendelian “Anlagen.” 33 The establishment of the chro-
mosomal theory of heredity needed a careful consideration of the role of the cytoplasm 
in heredity. This role proved absolutely critical: the chromosomes were indeed subject 
to active intervention by the cytoplasm. 
 In the years before the establishment of the chromosomal theory of heredity, Boveri 
had shown in microscopic studies that during ontogenesis the chromosomes of the 
somatic cells become reorganized or even dissolved. This process, called “chromosome” 
or “chromatin diminution” was necessary to explain cell differentiation, as it created 
the different genetic constitution of different somatic cells. 34 In 1910 Boveri published 
the results of experiments which he, his wife, and female PhD students and postdocs 
had performed to show that it was indeed the cytoplasm and the spatial and temporal 
distribution of its components that reorganized the chromosomes during ontogenesis 
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to make cell differentiation possible. 35 This activity of the cytoplasm was more or less 
axiomatically excluded from being present in the germ line, despite the fact that some 
observations could not be explained. 36 
 Shortly before Theodor Boveri’s untimely death in 1915, he and Marcella Boveri had 
reinvestigated his earlier findings based on the chromosome-deficient sea urchin egg 
cells. He identified these experiments as having been flawed by a methodological error, 
as he could not be positive that the egg cells’ chromosomal material had definitely 
disappeared. The new experimental findings of these “merogonic experiments,” how-
ever, clearly demonstrated a strong influence of the cytoplasm in early embryonic 
development, which even exceeded that of the chromosomes. 37 For the Boveris the 
interaction of chromosomes and cytoplasm was the crucial process for inheritance and 
development. Their experimental approach—based, as it was, on the fertilization of 
germ cells of sea urchin and the nematode worm  Ascaris , on systematic manipulations 
of these cells to change the interplay between chromosomes and cytoplasm, and on 
the subsequent interpretation of embryonic development—could not establish an 
absolute dominant role for the chromosomes. 
 The notion of chromosomes being the only and decisive material substrate for Men-
delian “Anlagen” was stabilized by those experimental systems, which traced the trans-
mission of invariant properties of male and female organisms through the generations. 
In the work of the Boveris the subtext of this focus becomes visible. In his 1902 paper 
on fertilization which obviously belongs to gender politics, Theodor Boveri discussed 
the evolution of sex difference and made it very clear that the cellular representative of 
the male was endangered by miniaturization. 38 The primordial unit of procreation was 
the omnipotent, dividing cell—“mother cell” dividing into “daughter cells,” placing 
reproduction clearly in a matrilineal framework. Procreation evolved further by the 
invention of cell fusion, followed by a differentiation into sex difference of cells: a large 
cell containing plasma and chromosomes and a tiny cell containing chromosomes 
only, plus eventually one centrosome which occasionally was necessary to start cell 
division after fertilization. It was the evolutionary fate of the male cell to become 
smaller and smaller to the point when only the remaining chromosomes guaranteed its 
necessity by providing a mechanism to create inheritable differences in the organisms 
of the next generation. These differences and their continuous recombination were 
seen—and are seen today—as an advantage in evolution, a view based on Weismann’s 
ideas of amphimixis. 39 
 Identifying the chromosomes as the material locus of Mendelian “Anlagen” created 
gender equality in procreation. The father’s contribution to the next generation 
was equal to that of the mother, despite the morphological and physiological differ-
ence between the germ cells, which were gendered according to the human model, 
where the female and male contributions to the offspring are unequal. With the 
focus on chromosomes the cytoplasm became the purely nurturing—and hence 
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female—element. Morgan and his colleagues used this model for their genetics and 
theory of the gene developed during the First World War. In the German genetics com-
munity the question whether the cell nucleus had the “monopoly” in heredity, or 
whether some plasmatic factors also acted as hereditary substance, was still prevalent 
in the 1920s. 40 Still, the relationship between cell plasma and chromosomes was mod-
eled along maternal nutrition and paternal control over the cell and organism. A fun-
damental reconceptualization of this gendered order, however, never took place. As we 
have seen, Felix Mainx could not go beyond the gender order of cell components in 
1933, even while de-gendering the germ cells themselves. Claims that the cytoplasm 
could and had to reorganize the chromosomes, at least in ontogenesis, and that the 
cytoplasm had a crucial role in early embryonic development, were left to the develop-
mental biologists and remained excluded from genetics for decades to come. 41 
 One might argue that it was simply the selection of the most productive experimen-
tal systems in the first decade of the twentieth century—the breeding experiments with 
 Drosophila melanogaster and with maize—that pushed genetics toward the search for 
genes as entities on the chromosomes, leaving the interplay of chromosomes and cyto-
plasm aside. 42 Looking for new breeding strategies and knowledge in the project of 
eugenics provided another motive for the concentration on organisms with a binary 
sex system. However, I would argue, the search for the paternal contribution to procre-
ation must have been a hidden agenda as well, structuring thought and driving motiva-
tion, thus helping to overlook the “female” cytoplasm as a relevant factor in heredity. 
 8.3  Chromosomal Sex Determination—A Telling Delay 
 Theodor and Marcella Boveri, who always sought to unravel the interplay of chromo-
somes and cytoplasm, allow us to see this hidden agenda. Theodor Boveri must have 
been fascinated by the idea that the chromosomes would guarantee gender equality in 
the sense of an equal male relevance in heredity. His rhetoric on the miniaturization of 
the male cell is revealing in this respect. Furthermore, until 1909 he stuck to his notion 
of the full equality of the cell nuclei and chromosomes of male and female germ cells. 
By doing so he recognized only rather late that the new interpretation of sex difference 
as based in a chromosome difference supported his 1903 theory of the specific rele-
vance of individual chromosomes as the locus for Mendelian “Anlagen.” 43 Nettie Maria 
Stevens had proposed this radical new understanding of sex difference in 1905 after her 
stay as a visiting scholar in Boveri’s Würzburg laboratory in 1902/1903 and after she 
had published a paper with Boveri in 1904. 44 Stevens claimed that male or female germ 
cells came in two versions, differing at the level of chromosomes, and thus creating two 
types of fertilized eggs, which developed into male or female organisms. In most 
cases the female cell had one chromosome more, or at least one larger chromosome, 
than the male. With this new interpretation, sex difference became an inheritable trait, 
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following Mendelian rules and challenging older assumptions of nutrition or other fac-
tors as responsible for the development of sex difference. 45 Also in 1905, Boveri’s old 
friend Edmund B. Wilson (1856–1939) had realized the correlation of sex difference 
and chromosomal difference. At that time, he, and Boveri, interpreted the additional 
chromosomal material in the female differently from Stevens. They saw it as an indica-
tor of the female’s higher assimilative powers, thus positioning the female in the clas-
sically gendered realm of nutrition. 
 Stevens’s interpretation, however, made sex difference a binary, discontinuous one, 
caused by the random distribution of chromosomes in the creation of germ cells. Her 
work and her later identification of the chromosomes of  Drosophila melanogaster were 
crucial preconditions for the project undertaken by Morgan’s group to map genes 
onto chromosomes. This became the foundation stone of Sturtevant and Beadle’s 
chromosomal sex-difference paradigm of genetics described at the beginning of this 
chapter. 46 
 Theodor Boveri was chosen in 1913 to act as director of the newly founded Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute for Biology in Berlin-Dahlem. He appointed the institute’s scientific 
staff, among them Max Hartmann and Richard Goldschmidt, and made the problem of 
sex determination, its inheritance, and development a central topic of the well-funded 
research institute. He ultimately resigned from the directorship before the institute’s 
inauguration, but, still, he can be credited for the support of a research program which 
in the 1920s investigated sex difference as the paradigmatic problem for genetics and 
embryology and finally helped to challenge the unquestioned assumption of a binary, 
discontinuous sex difference as its basis. 47 
 8.4  A New Binary Sex Difference—Paradoxes for Genetics and Gender Politics 
 Genetics and research into the processes of inheritance in the first decade of the twen-
tieth century were intertwined with the concept of a binary sex difference, where 
equality or hierarchy were the negotiated alternative orders. This gender concept had 
implications which moved in various and sometimes conflicting directions. In the 
sense of “doing gender,” the chromosomes became male and the crucial cellular struc-
ture to embody Mendelian genes. In this reconfiguration the paternal contribution to 
heredity equaled the maternal contribution, and the cytoplasm in turn acquired an 
auxiliary role and became female. A cellular asymmetry or generative difference in 
procreation was thus transformed into gender equality to compensate for a perceived 
male inferiority. In the order of the cell components, on the other hand, chromosomes 
and cytoplasm became gendered in a hierarchical way. By attributing to the cytoplasm 
an auxiliary role only, a blind spot was created in the conceptualization of genetics. 
 For gender politics, however, this development helped to support the attempts made 
for female emancipation in the first decade of the twentieth century. Referring to the 
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new findings of genetics, the female medical doctor Hope Adams-Lehmann (1855–
1916) and the doctor and geneticist Agnes Bluhm (1862–1943) stressed the point that 
women inherit 50% of their qualities from their fathers. Therefore they should be 
regarded as equals to their brothers. The Berlin zoologist Oscar Hertwig (1849–1922) 
argued for women’s access to university education using the findings of genetics. 48 It is 
probably difficult to imagine today how powerful the genetics-based equality claim was 
in the realm of the gender politics of that time. Genetics challenged male superiority 
and the usual male-centered genealogies. 
 However, the chromosome-dependent positive political support for gender equality 
had a price for biology: Mendelian inheritance was based on a hierarchical concept of 
sex difference, applied to the biological entities participating in procreation. In an 
ironic twist, it was exactly this hierarchical concept which helped to challenge wom-
en’s inequality in the realm of politics and social order. The new concept of chromo-
somal sex determination had multiple and incongruent effects. To provide another 
example, it also helped to undermine the customary censure of women when they did 
not give birth to the desired boys and heirs. Now the responsibility lay with the father, 
and it was the chromosomal constitution of his sperm that determined whether the 
child became male or female. 
 For genetics, chromosomal sex determination created a useful experimental tool. It 
had a key function in the development of Morgan’s theory of the gene by allowing the 
localization of genes, like the gene for white eyes, for example, on a sex chromosome, 
thus starting the creation of chromosomal gene maps for  Drosophila melanogaster . How-
ever, chromosomal sex determination also created a problem. It conceptualized sex 
difference as a binary, discontinuous, inheritable difference between either male or 
female, based on the presence or absence of chromosomal material. By doing so, genet-
ics became incompatible with embryology’s older notion of sex determination accord-
ing to which the development of male or female organisms derived from an organism 
with bisexual potency. 
 8.5  Challenging Binary Differences and Racial Purity 
 In the 1920s Richard Goldschmidt succeeded in harmonizing the genetic and embry-
onic understanding of sex determination. 49 Based on his experiments with the gypsy 
moth  Lymantria dispar , he proposed the theory that inheritable factors determining 
maleness or femaleness cooperated in one and the same organism. It was the actual 
balance of the two factors within one organism, and the correct timing of their activity, 
which led to the development of a male or female animal. This model allowed an 
explanation for the existence of so-called “intersexual” organisms, which showed fea-
tures of both sexes. Goldschmidt used it to depathologize sexual ambiguity and homo-
sexuality in humans. A detailed account of Goldschmidt’s work is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. 50 Only two aspects can be mentioned here in a rough abbreviation. 51 The 
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1927 genetic concept based on the  Lymantria experiments entailed the notion that 
genes were not stable in their effects. They could vary in their “strength” to create a 
particular feature in an organism. For this reason Goldschmidt’s politically right-wing 
colleagues in Germany did not accept his genetic model. It did not conform to their 
efforts to establish a new genetics-based racial anthropology—racial features had to be 
caused by stable, invariant genes; otherwise races were fluid and changeable units. 
 However, another aspect of Goldschmidt’s work proved to be very useful in the con-
text of right-wing politics. The crossbreeding of some different geographical popula-
tions of insects had resulted in “intersexual” animals. Against Goldschmidt’s intentions 
this result was used as the scientific proof for an old anti-Semitic, anti-feminist, and 
anti-democratic trope used in Imperial Germany: that miscegenation would blur a 
clear-cut gender dichotomy in humans, thus causing the degeneration of the suppos-
edly most developed Nordic race. Again, the scientific and political uses of the same 
gender concept had conflicting consequences. On the one hand we find the integra-
tion of genetics and embryology, and support for a policy of emancipation for homo-
sexuals; on the other hand we see the propaganda for racial purity, pure masculinity 
and femininity, dismissing every new invention on the human gender front as a sign 
of degeneration in Weimar Germany. 
 When the Nazis came to power, Goldschmidt was forced to emigrate. He survived in 
the United States, but he never achieved as elevated a position there as that which he 
had held in Germany. His pre–World War II work was positively received in the United 
Kingdom. 52 However, his genetic concepts, which he further developed after 1936, did 
not become mainstream. The new concepts of molecular genetics developed in the 
1950s and thereafter did not integrate Goldschmidt’s work and its questions. They were 
only reconsidered in the late 1980s. 53 
 8.6  Epilogue: The Gender of DNA and Aristotle Rediscovered in the 1970s 
 In the 1960s and 1970s the problem of sex difference was seemingly irrelevant for 
genetics, but a closer look reveals that it was central. In 1970 François Jacob began his 
highly influential book,  The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity , with a statement similar 
to that of Beadle and Sturtevant in 1939 in its claim of something “immediately 
evident,” but different from it in its focus on identical reproduction: “Few phenomena 
in the living world are so immediately evident as the begetting of like by like. A 
child soon comes to realize that dog is born of dog and corn comes from corn.” 54 Jacob 
continued, 
 Heredity is described today in terms of information, messages and code. […] What are transmit-
ted from generation to generation are the “instructions” specifying the molecular structures: the 
architectural plans of the future organism. They are also the means of executing these plans 
and of coordinating the activities of the system. In the chromosomes received from its parents, 
each egg therefore contains its entire future. […] The organism thus becomes the realisation of 
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a programme prescribed by its heredity. […] The aim is to prepare a completely identical pro-
gramme for the next generation. The aim is to reproduce. 55 
 Jacob conceptualized genetics as the science that investigates the reproduction of 
the same. Genetics was no longer based on the tracing of differences; sex differences 
appear to be completely absent, fertilization processes irrelevant. 
 Jacob’s asexual concept of genetics and inheritance is surprising in view of the fact 
that in their practical work Jacob and his colleagues attributed a classic binary sex dif-
ference to their unicellular model organisms. They identified DNA donating cells as 
male, receiving cells as female. 56 They called their central experimental interventions 
“coitus interruptus.” 57 This was the interruption of the DNA transfer between bacteria 
at a definite time to estimate the length of the transferred DNA. 
 This experimental technique became a central practice for bacterial genetics, in the 
mapping of bacterial chromosomes, and is usually called “mapping by mating.” 58 It 
was exactly this modeling of inheritance in bacteria, viruses, and unicellular yeast 
according to the sexual processes in higher organisms which allowed the development 
of the new DNA-based gene concept in molecular genetics. 59 DNA replaced the chro-
mosomes as the central player in heredity, and the old Mendelian, sex-difference-based 
gene concept could thus be applied to evolutionarily earlier processes of inheritance. 
For my point here it is not the main problem that Jacob and others attributed to bacte-
ria the same processes of inheritance that had been deduced from that of higher organ-
isms using sexual reproduction. Nor is it the transference in the other direction, when 
molecular genetics transferred genetic models from procaryotes to higher organisms. 
The problem rather lies in the unconscious nature of this transference from organisms 
with sexual reproduction to single cells dividing, which prevents a reflection on the 
implicit trajectories and limitations of the concepts used. 
 Jacob praised the genetic program, and it is known that Michel Foucault was fasci-
nated by the idea that it provided instructions which were realized by the organism. 60 
I want to stress only one point here: the concept of the genetic program re-producing 
the same way in every generation entails a classic figure of Aristotelian thought and the 
theory of procreation and inheritance that went with it. This concept was consciously 
brought into the debate by a colleague of Jacob. In his 1971 contribution to a Fest-
schrift for Jacob’s former superior André Lwoff (1902–1994), Max Delbrück (1906–
1981), German émigré physicist and founder of the phage group, proposed, partly 
tongue-in-cheek, and partly seriously, that Aristotle should be given the Nobel prize for 
his discovery of the principle embodied in DNA. 61 According to Delbrück, the idea of 
the genetic program was equivalent to Aristotle’s formal cause in male sperm, which 
shaped female matter. Delbrück even saw Aristotle’s concept of the prime mover, the 
godlike first cause, as applicable to DNA. 
 The classic Aristotelian binary—the male formal cause and the female material 
cause—is a hierarchical one which disadvantages the female. It was developed and used 
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by Aristotle to legitimize the exclusion of women from political equality. He saw 
woman as a deviant man, almost a malformation. Man was the incorporation of the 
eternal ideal form, which was reproduced with the help of woman, in the chain of 
generations. Delbrück used German language studies on Aristotle to make his claim, 
but he completely missed the medical historian Erna Lesky’s 1950 study of ancient 
theories of procreation, where she clearly demonstrated that Aristotle’s theory was 
simultaneously a political gender theory to legitimize male superiority. 62 
 By hailing the re-production of the same, Jacob and others hid gender difference, 
especially the generative difference and its hierarchization to the disadvantage of the 
female. They provide a textbook example for a binary order, which takes one side of the 
binary as the general and the other side as its derivation, dependent, or “other.” 63 
Genetics, for decades to come, treated DNA as the representative of the organism. Craig 
Venter’s recent cyborgs made out of synthetic DNA and bacterial cell bodies function 
in this sense, and will never, according to his understanding, create spontaneously 
something different from that which he designed. 
 The history of the different gender concepts in genetics that I have reviewed in this 
chapter shows not only their relevance, but also how varied they have been in both 
their scientific and political implications. There were equality claims in a binary order, 
negotiations and acknowledgments of a mutual dependence of the two; the creation of 
inequalities up to the point that one element of the binary became the representative 
of the whole and the other one auxiliary or even irrelevant; and there was the concept 
of a binary gender order, which nevertheless allowed for intermediate forms, and more 
important than that, postulated that both elements of the binary entailed both quali-
ties. These gendered orders were attributed to biological entities and processes at differ-
ent times, and embedded in different experimental approaches to heredity. 
 It will be interesting to see in what way genetics will be reconceptualized in the 
future. 64 This process will not only have to consider new gender concepts but will also 
have to face deeply embedded biological concepts, experimental approaches, powerful 
machinery, and vested interests which place hope for future medical therapies and 
agricultural and biotechnological developments on the dominant concept of DNA as 
providing the crucial tools and information. 
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